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Is the ‘euro crisis’ closer to a resolution? Europe’s 
leaders have promised to find by the end of this 
month a comprehensive package, not only to end 
this crisis, but also to preserve the stability of the 
euro for the future. Unfortunately they are unlikely 
to succeed because most of the elements of the 
package on the table so far deal with the symptoms, 
not the underlying cause of the crisis.  
Chancellor Merkel likes to underline, rightly, that 
one should not speak of a ‘euro crisis’, but of a ‘debt 
crisis’. If she had added that this is a crisis of both 
sovereign and bank debt, she would have been even 
more right. But an immediate corollary of this 
diagnosis is that to deal with this crisis one would 
have to find a solution for the debt problem, i.e. the 
problem of over-indebted sovereigns and insolvent 
banks. Unfortunately nothing is being done on 
these crucial aspects. The new complex mechanisms 
for economic policy coordination that dominate the 
EU’s agenda might be useful to push euro area 
member countries to adopt more sensible policies, 
making their economies more competitive and their 
fiscal positions stronger. But one should not forget 
that until recently Ireland and to some extent Spain 
were held up as the shining examples of competitive 
economies that created a record number of jobs. It 
is thus doubtful that tighter economic policy 
coordination will prevent new bubbles from 
emerging. When powerful booms emerge in 
different sectors, the temptation to argue that ‘this 
time is different’ will again be irresistible. 
Financial markets at any rate do not care much 
about the future set-up for economic policy 
coordination in the eurozone. They need to know 
how the existing debt overhang will be dealt with 
today. But why should a debt problem in economies 
that are usually called ‘peripheral’ be so important 
for financial markets? Greece and Ireland, even 
taken together, account not even for 5% of the 
economy of the euro area. Their problems would 
not constitute a major issue if Europe’s financial 
system were robust. A peripheral debt crisis has 
mutated into a systemic crisis because the financial 
system of the euro area is too interconnected and 
too weak. 
Given the interconnectedness of financial markets 
in a common currency area, weakness in any one 
corner spills over into the entire system, which 
cannot be stabilised until all of its major 
components have been dealt with. But Europe lacks 
a common body that has the fiscal resources to 
stabilise the system as a whole. The required fiscal 
resources exist at the national level, but their use is 
generally guided by purely national considerations 
and interests.  In other words: Europe faces a 
fundamental collective action problem. 
Experience has shown that it takes an acute crisis to 
force Europe’s leaders to come together in a 
concerted effort.  But so far nothing has been done 
to address the fundamental problem that there is no 
common body to look after the stability of the entire 
financial system.  
 
In the autumn of 2008, at the height of the global 
financial crisis, the heads of state of the euro area 
did not consider the creation of a common bank 
rescue fund. Instead they settled for a package of 
national measures to stabilise national banking 
systems one by one. The sum of the headline 
commitment was impressive, amounting to 20% of 
GDP. However, the show of unity did not last 
long. Execution of the package was rather uneven, 
with some countries ending up not doing anything. 
The key areas of weakness in Europe’s financial 
markets, which include undercapitalised banks in 
core countries, were thus not addressed, and the 
system was not able to withstand the second wave 
of the crisis: the peripheral debt crisis.  
The Greek and Irish crises were initially greeted 
with disbelief. The official line until the very end 
was that both countries might be in a tough 
situation, but they were on the right track and if 
only financial markets would give them credit there 
would be no problem.  
However, when investors entered a buyers’ strike 
(and depositors started to flee from Irish banks), 
Europe’s leaders were moved to grant both 
countries new lines of credit. Since the European 
Council of February 2010, the guiding principle has 
been that safeguarding financial stability is a 
‘collective responsibility’.1  
At the highest political level this was meant to 
signal that the European Council would do 
‘whatever it takes’ to stabilize the euro. In practice, 
however, the kind of ‘collective responsibility’ that 
has actually been implemented does not solve the 
collective action problem because the underlying 
assumption has been that the entire system would 
be stable if every national banking system was 
stabilized. This is clearly not the case, however, 
because every national authority will just expend 
the minimum in effort to stabilize its own national 
banks, assuming that the rest of the system is in 
good shape. 
 
                                                            
1 See Statement by the Heads of State or Government of the 
EU, 11 February 2010 
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/press
data/en/ec/112856.pdf). 
 
This is why very little has been done so far to 
strengthen the ability of the financial system to 
withstand a default of any magnitude. The only 
attempt in this direction was the publication, in 
July of 2010, of the results of the stress tests on over 
90 of the EU’s largest banks. But this episode 
showed once more what one has to expect when 
there is no EU-wide body to look after systemic 
stability. Every national supervisor has an incentive 
to find that ‘our banks are safe’, even if many 
institutions are only thinly capitalised and thus 
contribute to the fragility of the system as a whole. 
The degree to which this was true became apparent 
in November 2010, when it emerged that essentially 
the entire Irish banking system, which had received 
a clean bill of health no longer ago than June, was 
bankrupt – and the market decided that this might 
apply also to the Irish government, which then had 
to be bailed out by the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF).  
The ‘euro crisis’ can thus end only if the euro’s 
financial system were strengthened so that debt 
problems in the European periphery no longer 
threatened the stability of the system as a whole. 
This will require a number of elements, such as 
higher capital requirements on sovereign debt, real 
stress-testing and enlarging the mandate of the 
EFSF so that it could also recapitalise banks, and 
not just bail out countries. Ensuring systemic 
financial stability is the order of the day. That, 
rather than elaborate mechanisms for economic-
policy coordination or grand designs for 
competitiveness, should be at the top of the 
European Council’s agenda. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 